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Abstract
This article discusses the notion of efficient statute law. The hypothesis that the common law
develops towards efficiency is the organizing principle of the new law and economics as it
originated at the University of Chicago School of Law. However, the hypothesis can be
regarded as too limited. In this article it is shown that statute law under specific circumstances
can also be described as developing towards efficient solutions. This is shown in terms of a set
of three models.
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1Efficient Statute Law
Due to its development from different sources such as common law and equity as brought
across the ocean from England, the Code Civil in Louisiana, widely divergent state law, and
federal statute law, regulations and jurisdiction, American civil law has traditionally been hard
to comprehend and therefore also hard to teach. On the basis of the teachings at the University
of Chicago School, notably by Aaron Director, Richard Posner built a legal doctrine and text
book presentation of American law (Posner 1981), but notably American civil law, on the
hypothesis that it can be described and taught as if it had been designed with economic
efficiency in mind. This hypothesis seems to fly in the face of both legal history and the
received body of public choice theory, including the economic theory of rent seeking. It is
therefore necessary to show under what conditions we can expect the law to develop so as to
facilitate market exchange, by reducing transactions costs and thereby allowing for a deep
division of labour in the economy. This essay offers a simple model based discussion of why
not only the common law but also statute law can be expected to develop towards efficiency,
and spells out the conditions of this development. In conclusion, statute law moves towards
efficiency not only through legislation but also through jurisdiction.
I.  The Debate on the Efficiency of the Common Law
A steady flow of papers over recent decades in the economic analysis of law suggests that the
common law evolves toward efficiency (Cooter & Kornhauser 1980, Goodman 1978.
Hirshleifer 1982, Landes & Posner 1979, Posner 1977 (2), Priest 1977, but with reservations,
2Rubin 1977, 1982, Terrebonne 1981); the implication being that statute law does not. There
are others who disagree, e.g. Richard Posner is now Adistinctly skeptical about the claim@
(personal communication). The notion has nevertheless become so deeply rooted in the
folklore of the law and economics subdiscipline that it has rendered meaningful discussions
about efficient legislation by code or statute very difficult. Despite the different formulations,
the suggestion turns on the proposition that inefficient law creates large transactions costs:
hence, parties gain from having inefficient legal arrangements removed. It follows that
inefficient legal rules will be litigated again and again, until they approach efficiency.
Michelman (1980) showed that this tendency should hold for judicial behaviour under either
type of law, common or enacted. We should therefore observe a tendency toward efficiency in
judicial rule making, independent of the particular legal culture in which a judge opines.
Whereas Michelman's amendment to the Posnerian argument considerably weakens the case
for the superiority and singular efficiency of the common law, it refocuses attention on the
body of law to which judicial decision making gives rise. That judicial decision making tends
toward "efficient" (defined as wealth maximizing) legal rules (Posner 1981, Hofstra Law
Review Symposium 1, 11 1980 and from a critical viewpoint, Samuels 1981) is quite consis-
tent with another contention, dating back to Bentham (1789, Works 1838- 1843, 1968), that
the comon law, as a system of rules, lacks coherence and rationality and hence is less efficient
than a code (one might add "can conceivably be"). The successive judicial decisions groping
towards efficiency may reach a local optimum, an optimum that can be inferior, as Pareto
emphasized, to an inefficient solution reached otherwise.
Further doubt is cast on the notion that the common law converges toards fficiency, since
the supposition that inefficient rules will be relit gat d rests on the assumption that the judiciary
is a monopolistic provider of legal decisions. Inefficient legal arrangements need not be re-
3litigated. Parties will engage in litigation only if each of them expects the benefits from
litigation to exceed the costs. When inefficient verdicts are expected, parties will be reluctant
to litigate and prefer rather to settle out of court. The tendency toward efficiency is not a
dependable one. As Priest and Klein (1984) have shown, litigation depends largely on how
close the parties estimate the dispute to remain to the court's established decision standard.
"Close" cases are most likely to be re-litigated, as are those in which one party has a relatively
larger stake than the other. It follows that both efficient and inefficient decision rules can be
perpetuated (This begs a related question: Where will those parties turn that have been
frustrated by inefficient court rulings? Answers to this question of substitute re-litigation will,
of course, hinge on the availability of alternative sources of adjudication). Disregarding for the
moment private avenues of adjudication, it appears that whether the law is efficient will depend
more on the performance of legislature  than the prevailing literature suggests.
In the following section I propose three variations of a simple model to show under what
conditions we can expect the legislature to enact efficient law.
II. Three simple models
In keeping with Michelman's (1980) distinction, we assume that there are two types of law in
any society: law that every incremental enactment or judicial opinion builds on (Michelman
calls it "background law), and law that was a "deal" to redistribute income away from one
group and toward another. In this transfer, the legislator is seen as a broker who acts for a fee
(McCormick & Tollison 1981). "Deal law" may then be efficient in maximizing the wealth of
the society in the long run, but it need not be. Conventionally, "background law" should tend
toward efficiency, although my preceding remarks leave this supposition in doubt.
4"Background law" may be either common law or codified case law, consisting of pure
codifications or a combination of these elements. Hence, we can assume, in each jurisdiction, a
certain amount of competition beween the legislature and the judiciary in providing
"background law". While Michelman's distinction between "background law" and "deal law" is
a straightforward one, identifying a particular piece of legislation as being either "background
law" or "deal law" may be less so. It is perfectly possible that an act of parliament contains
both. As Posner has pointed out, the distinction may require some deeper analysis in each
individual case. He notes that "courts cannot readily identify purely redistributive legislation, in
part because such redistributive legislation may be defensible on efficiency grounds by
reference to problems of social peace, free rider problems and so forth@ (See Richa d A.
Posner, 1987, at note 12).
Fortunately for the purpose of this essay, this distinction need not be operatio alized (Aretz,
1993). For a study of a particular legislative process, the distinction would have to be
established by developing a model that is able to capture the impact of the legislation on the
performance of the affected natural or legal persons.
A. Political Entrepreneurs
Assume a legislature made up of representatives who broker their legislative services for a fee.
They are individual wealth maximizers, an assumption which is standard in the American
context although one may wonder whether it contains a reasonable description of political
processes in Europe, where political parties tend to play a much greater role than in the United
States. Still, important interest groups are expediently and reliably served by their parties or
caucuses, and particular politicians specialize in particular interest groups.
5The demand for legislative income transfers is fairly straightforward. It requires a group so
small that the benefit bestowed upon it is clearly perceptible for each member is sufficiently
well organized as to prevent dissipation of the benefit and able to provide the necessary
brokerage fee in terms of either votes or pecuniary (and lawful) benefits.
The suppliers of wealth transfers must, in turn, be difficult to organize and inelastic in their
response to legislation. A threat of facing a one dollar loss as a consequence of legislation will
not result in a one dollar increase in expenditure to fight it; the expected individual costs of
mounting a political defence exceed the expected individual gains from not being coerced into
a wealth transfer. The opportunity costs of resisting the wealth transfer must exceed the per
capita amounts transferred.
The more durable the enactment and the larger the transfer it provides, the more the receiving
interest group is willing to pay. Yet, for the providing group, the more durable the enactment
and the larger the transfer, the higher will be the benefit from resisting the transfer, whereas
opportunity costs remain unaffected. Hence, wealth transfers are subject to a scale restriction
that is determined by the (transactions) costs of resisting them. We should therefore observe
multiple small transfers involving different groups of suppliers.
The main cost element facing groups that are either seeking or resisting wealth transfers are
start-up costs, hence once they are borne, they no longer affect marginal costs. Established
interest groups, then, enjoy an advantage in both seeking and resisting wealth transfers. This
advantage amounts to a strong incentive for an established clientele of transfer recipients.
A transfer may be large and durable, yet only affect each supplier to a small extent. Still, the
larger the group of suppliers and the larger or more durable the transfer (or both), the higher
the benefits will be from resisting. Votes and wealth can be assumed to be convertible. Si c
6brokers compete for wealth or votes, political entrepreneurs may seek out groups of suppliers
and, in return for their votes, oppose transfer programmes on their behalf. The larger the group
of suppliers involved, or the larger or more durable the transfer sought, the higher the
probability that a competing broker will organize resistance to a proposed wealth transfer.
It follows that "deal law" should be of relatively shorter durability than "background law".
Likewise, "deal law" should strongly benefit established groups and only mildly harm small,
scattered groups; that is, "deal law" should not impose considerable welfare losses on the
general public. There are clearly tendencies in society that contain the social loss from rent
seeking (Tullock 1980).
Assuming convertibility between wealth and votes, legislative brokers can either seek to serve
established interest groups or appeal to large groups of general interest voters. They will
probably do both; they have an incentive to produce legislation that benefits many while
harming few. Generous transfers are largely precluded since a transfer that is perceptibly to
benefit many must impose a heavy burden on a few. Such a transfer will not be supplied
because the benefits from resisting it will generally exceed the opportunity costs of forgoing
the resistance. It follows that legislative brokers have an incentive to produce legislation that is
capable of producing wealth for the general public; the more durable this wealth-producing
legislation, the larger the benefit from it and, presumably, the larger the expected return in
votes. Legislators face incentives to produce durable wealth-enhancing legislation side by side
with incentives to broker transfers of relatively limited duration. This holds true under the
assumption that legislators have sufficient information. While obviously legislators are not
omniscient, they can rely on their clients to possess and process the relevant information.
Wealth reducing legislation will be brought to the attention of the legislators by those whose
wealth is being affected as well as by the press.
7We conclude that brokers in the legislature face incentives to produce both efficient
"background law" as well as (mildly) inefficient "deal law". "Mildly" inefficient is a deliberately
loose term, since the argument is cast in terms of tendencies, not precisely quantifiable
magnitudes. I mean to suggest that the (negative) welfare costs of deal law in this scenario will
be relatively minor as compared to the (positive) welfare effects of background law.
B. The Open Jurisdiction
The second model differs from the first in two respects. It assumes that the jurisdiction is open
in the sense that citizens and corporations can either resist or escape unwanted legislation.
They may escape into other jurisdictions or into an extralegal domain within the jurisdiction,
such as an underground or shadow economy. The first alternative is relatively straightforward,
the equivalent to the small open economy in international trade heory. The smaller the
jurisdiction and the more flexible the agents it comprises, the more elastic we can expect the
evasive response to be. Even if the jurisdiction is "big" and closed, however, the room for
avoidance may be substantial. Regulations can be avoided by taking up other lines of business.
Conflicts can routinely be settled out of court or conflict prone transactions can be avoided
altogether. Alternative forms of dispute resolution can be resorted to or initiated. Finally,
producers can withdraw from market transactions and shift exchanges of goods and services
into an organization designed to reduce transactions costs (Williamson 1981).
None of these developments is included in what has been labelled the shadow economy, which
itself is reputed to be a sizable extralegal sector in advanced Western economies (Simon &
Witte 1982, Tanzi 1982). The shadow economy, then, can be assumed to provide scope for
escape in addition to the avoidance strategi s already listed above (Frey & Ramser 1986, Frey
8& Weck 1983).
This modification of our model has two implications: the larger the potential for evasive action,
the smaller the citizens' incentive will be to resist "deal" law that aims at extracting transfers,
and the smaller the extracted transfer, particularly in the long run. While this leaves the demand
for transfers unaffected, increasing the scope for avoidance dries up the supply and raises the
legislators' cost of providing transfers, or "deal laws".
Secondly, the larger the scope for escape, the stronger the competitive pressure will be on
legislators to produce efficient legal arrangements. And the stronger those competitive
pressures are, the more likely it is that the economy will experience an expansion of its
production possibility frontier.
The efficiency effect of "deal law" when supply dries up is essentially secondary, that is, that
efficiency loss occurs in terms of productive activities foregone in an economy. These are the
opportunity costs of "deal law". Obviously, they depend on the extent to which opportunities
for wealth production are foreclosed by "deal law". This effect implies that the general welfare
loss of "deal law" increases with the scope for evasive action.
Where resistance to "deal law" weakens and transfers decline, a large number of "deal laws"
will be enacted. This observation reinforces the aforementioned tendency for "deal laws" to be
numerous but of relatively limited direct impact on attained wealth. By the same reasoning,
however, "deal laws" contract the production possibility frontier of the economy as a whole
and hence affect citizens' attainable wealth positions.
We can conclude that in an "open" jurisdiction, legislators face even stronger incentives to
produce efficient "background law", whereas inc ntives to produce "deal law" become weaker
relative to the first model.
9C. Introducing Leviathan
The third model expands on the second in featuring an open jurisdiction, a Leviathan
legislature (Buchanan & Brennan 1980) that seeks to maximize revenues from taxation, and a
judiciary that adjudicates litigation by professional standards of jurisprudence and remains
unaffected by the revenue maximization behaviour of the legislature. Hence, an independent
judiciary is assumed. Model C is designed to capture the long-run implications of legislators'
activities on the efficiency of the whole body of law.
In Leviathan models legislators are again assumed to maximize the sum of political profits from
taxation, on the one hand, and regulation (i.e. "deal law@) on the other. Taxation and regulation
are not only interchangeable as political means. While policies based on either invariably
burden the citizenry, the size and fertility of the tax base is itself affected by the extent of
regulation (Posner, 1986) a trade-off long noted in economics. (See Backhaus & Wagner
1987) Similarly the regulatory domain shrinks as the burden of taxation increases, and vice
versa, reducing the burden of taxation opens up the regulatory domain. From this simple
argument it follows that the production of "deal law" impairs the fertility of the tax base.
Hence, "deal laws" generate negative externalities for the legislature as a whole by reducing the
tax pie.
In the Leviathan literature (Buchanan & Brennan 1980, Buchanan & Lee 1982) it is customary
to assume that Leviathan acts myopically. The long-run tax rate is assumed to exceed that rate
which would yield the maximum stream of tax revenues; likewise the long-run regulatory
intensity exceeds that regulatory intensity which would maximize the production of "deal law"
in the long run. Frey and Ramser (1983) have shown, however, that the short-run optimization
of tax rates as well as regulatory intensities (considered simultaneously) can yield
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overregulation in tandem with undertaxation. It then appears that Leviathan's myopia is at odds
with the beast's appetite. Shortrun optimization does not yield a maximum political profit.
By way of clarification suppose there is a unicameral legislature (according to McCormick &
Tollison 1981 a unicameral legislative is more conducive to interest group, i.e. "deal law",
legislation than a bicameral legislature, especially if the two houses are of uneven size) and
delegates may be re-elected. Then we can classify the delegates into cohorts according to the
length of their tenure in the legislature. Whereas seniority can safely be assumed to carry
additional power, there will always be a cohort that contains more members than a given one
chosen at random. The larger cohort will be composed of younger delegates than the smaller
one. This rule applies to all but the youngest cohort, which will be the largest. Hence, votes
tend to be concentrated with younger delegates. The longer the tenure of a delegate, the
shorter is his expected future tenure, and thus the shorter his time horizon can be in taking
political decisions. Empirically we also observe that elected officials' reelection probabilities are
a positive function of the length of their past tenure. The empirical base is McCormick=s and
Tollison=s (1981). In a majority voting system based on districts, districts will compote for the
most viable candidates in order to garner a majority, notably in a multi-party system. An under-
researched case is the Imperial German democracy. The leading politician of the (Catholic or
ultra mountain) Centre party, Count Ballestrem, had his estate in Upper Silesia and was elected
there for the district of Oppeln to the Imperial Diet in 1872. He was a leading adversary of
Bismarck in the confrontation with the Pope, was first Vice president of the Diet (1890-93)
and representative of Meppen at the very Western border of the Empire (1891-94) for the
Royal Prussian Diet. The point is that districts will compete for candidates, and the
competition will land the most viable candidates in the safest candidacies.
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The relatively lower reelection chance of younger representatives affects the length of their
time horizon only insofar as political gains and losses of "deal law" can be more heavily
discounted in the immediate future where reelection is uncertain. Long run effects, however,
will be important for younger elected officials who can expect to be held responsible for "deal"
legislation they supported. Hence, elder delegates should be observed to be more prone to
"deal law" than younger delegates. Conversely, th  "newcomers" are more likely to take a
long-run view, since they stand a greater chance not only of being confronted with the adverse
consequences of sizing down the tax base or regulatory domain but of profiting individually
from a large future tax base and unimpaired regulatory domains. Their opportunity cost of
exposing deals is lower than that of longer serving legislators; it may even be nil. Since
powerful interest groups will turn primarily to senior legislators who can deliver better deals,
exposing those deals may be the best strategy in trying to depose long serving incumbents.
Thus, gains from exposing "deal law" and introduci g "background law" are likely to be
highest for junior candidates, even if their expected tenure in office may remain relatively low
due to lower (re-)election chances. In turn, delegates who take a longterm view utnumber
their elder colleagues; more particularly, they have an incentive to produce "background law"
that broadens the tax base and increases its fertility by expanding the production possibility
frontier of the economy. All this suggests that "deal laws" will often be opposed by younger
politicians who try to build political coalitions of transfer vicims, thus seeking votes in the
present while preserving their political power base for the future. This tendency should be
observable in particular where politicians can claim revenue sources or regulatory domains,
i.e., when political property rights are allowed to develop.
Conclusion
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Will democratic legislatures largely engage in producing "deal law" at the expense of providing
the economy with "background law"? Under the strict assumptions that legislatures consist of
political brokers who act in a Leviathan environment, the conclusion is a resounding no.
Brokers in the legislatures face incentives to produce efficient "background law" as well as
(mildly) inefficient "deal law".
Although these incentives hold in a closed jurisdiction, in an open jurisdicti n legislators face
even stronger incentives to produce efficient "background law", whereas incentives to produce
"deal law" become weaker relative to the first model. Finally, taking a long-run view, one notes
that "deal laws" will often be opposed by younger politicians who try to build political
coalitions of transfer victims, thus seeking votes in the present and preserving their political
power base for the future. This tendency should be observable in particular where politicians
can claim revenue sources or regulatory domains, i.e., when political property rights are
allowed to develop.
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